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Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority
Rights
JEANNINE BELL*
"It may be true that morality cannot be legislated, but behavior can be regulated. The
law may not change the heart, but it can restrain the heartless. ,,
INTRODUCTION
In Spain on November 17, 2004, during a friendly soccer match between Spain
and England, two Black players for the English team were subjected to monkey
noises and racist slogans chanted by thousands of fans in the 55,000-seat stadium.
2
In 2002, a Black woman purchased a house in an all-White neighborhood in
Mobile County, Alabama. Upon arriving at the house to prepare it for occupancy,
she found the back door of the house had been kicked in. The intruders had
sprayed "KKK" and "Nigga" in red letters across the living room walls of her new
home.
3
In New York City, an anti-Semitic smear was found in a bathroom on a college
campus building. The images discovered were a swastika and a caricature of a man
wearing a yarmulke, which had been drawn in black ink on a stall door.
Racially offensive slogans like those directed at the English soccer players in the
anecdote above-slurs, epithets, and symbols-are all forms of racist speech. In the
United States, racist speech, along with anti-gay and anti-religious speech, falls into the
category called "hate speech."5 Though there is no commonly agreed upon definition
of hate speech, the international advocacy organization Human Rights Watch defines
* Professor of Law, Charles F. Whistler Faculty Fellow, Indiana University Maurer
School of Law - Bloomington. I would like to thank Professor Elisabeth Zoller for her
helpful comments. Many thanks as well to Rita Eads for secretarial assistance and to Obiechina
Ene for research assistance. This Article was originally delivered as a conference paper at a
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2007, at B 1.
5. See SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 8
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hate speech expansively as "any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial,
ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities, and to women." 6 While
people who are targeted by such an expression because of their race or ethnicity can be
victims of racist hate speech, the broad nature of this definition reaches out to those
who are frequently targeted by any form of hate speech. At least when reports are
analyzed, the majority of victims of hate speech all too often lack social power, and are
frequently discrete or insular minorities. In addition, the victims are likely to belong to
groups that have been historically discriminated against.
In this Article, I limit my focus to racist speech, which I define as speech that is
offensive to individuals or groups on the basis of their actual or perceived race, color,
ethnicity, or nation of origin. Part I dissects and examines racist expression by
providing contemporary manifestations of racist speech and briefly describing the
attendant difficulties that such expression creates for those at whom it is targeted. Part
II examines how such expression has been regulated in the United States. Part III
argues for regulation due to the connection between racist speech and extremist
violence.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONTEMPORARY RACIST EXPRESSION IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. The Locale: The Home, the Workplace, and Public Spaces
The complicated racial history of the United States has led to significant racial
tension in this country over the last several hundred years. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
vestiges of the United States' tumultuous racial history remain as racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities in areas across the country have been frequently targeted by racist
expression in both public and private spaces. One of the most disturbing places in
which individuals have faced racist speech and behavior has been in their living
spaces-their homes.7 Such behavior is still prevalent in the United States. Even in the
past twenty years, minorities moving to all-White neighborhoods in cities across the
country have faced slurs, epithets, and other expressions of racism directed at them by
White neighbors who wish to drive them out of the community.8 One prominent
example of racist expression occurring in and around individuals' homes is when a
cross is burned on someone's lawn. In the United States, a burning cross is a powerful
symbol. Cross burning is strongly associated with the violence that was perpetrated by
the Ku Klux Klan and others. Cross burning was accompanied by other sorts of
violence, or served as its precursor.9 Given this history, it is perhaps unsurprising that
in the majority of cases, cross bumings are directed at Black Americans, or those
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Pickett, supra note 3 (describing three families who discovered racist graffiti
on their homes).
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG AS THEY DON'T MOvE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLCT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (2000); Jeannine Bell, Hate
Thy Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the Persistence of Segregation, 501no ST. J. CRIm.
LAW 47 (2007); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White
Neighbors' Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2002).
9. See Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 8, at 355-56.
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associated with them---for example, a member of an interracial couple. 10 Not all racist
expression targeted at individuals in their homes involves an action, such as cross
burning. In some cases, racist expression directed at individuals in their homes may
simply consist of harassment in the form of racial and ethnic slurs.' 1
Federal and state cases alleging workplace discrimination suggest that racist speech
is also common in U.S. workplaces. The legal tolerance for such expression varies
based on the severity of the expression. Courts have allowed the infrequent use of slurs
and epithets in the workplace. 12 If the use of racist speech in the workplace meets the
legal standard for harassment, however, it may violate federal and state laws providing
for equal opportunity in employment.' 3 Despite such sanctions under federal and state
law, research has found racial harassment in the form of racist expression to be quite
prevalent.14 A few of the more graphic examples of speech used by co-workers and
supervisors of minority employees include slurs and epithets, for example, referring to
a Black employee as "that stupid nigger,"'15 racist jokes, and cartoons or symbols left in
the employees' work area.' 6 The different venues in which workplace speech may be
experienced depends on the circumstances of one's employment. As the soccer
anecdote at the beginning of this Article suggests, racial minorities who are athletes
10. See United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 685 (4th Cir. 2004) (cross burning near
property of interracial couple); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 780 (7th Cir. 1998)
(cross burning in front of interracial couple's trailer); United States v. Sheldon, No. 96-4375,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3435, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1997) (convicting defendant forburning a
cross on the front lawn of an interracial couple's house).
11. E.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327,
328 (7th Cir. 2004) (ethnic slur written on the Jewish plaintiffs' property); Ohana v. 180
Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238,239 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (slurs directed at Jewish
residents by their neighbors).
12. See. e.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985).
13. Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer "against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). In
order for the employer to be held liable, however, behavior must be "sufficiently severe or
pervasive." Jerome R. Watson & Richard W. Warren, "I Heard it Through the Grapevine":
Evidentiary Challenges in Racially Hostile Work Environment Litigation, 19 LAB. LAW. 381,
401 (2004). Courts have interpreted this language to mean that the occasional ethnic slur does
not rise to the level of racial harassment under Title VII. See id.
14. See Vincent J. Roscigno, Lisette M. Garcia & Donna Bobbitt-Zehzer, Social Closure
and Processes of Race/Sex Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci. 16,28-34 (2007).
15. Armstrong v. Lance, Inc., No. 93-1298, 1994 WL 173192, at *2 (4th Cir. May 9, 1994);
see also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1408 (10th Cir. 1987) (Blacks referred to as
niggers and coons); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 799 F.2d 1210, 1213 n.7 (8th Cir. 1986) (use
of slurs, anti-Black graffiti against workers); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1098 (2d
Cir. 1986) (use of slurs and racially offensive cartoons and photographs); Johnson v. Bunny
Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (referring to employees as niggers); Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (referring to employee
as a "dago" and to other Italian-American employees as the "Mafia").
16. EEOC v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 697-98 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ku Klux Klan
symbols and racial graffiti in the work area).
2009]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
may be confronted with racist speech "backstage" in the locker room and also while
performing, as fans hurl slurs and epithets from the stands.,
7
B. The Impact of Racist Speech on Individuals
Those who argue for restrictions on racist speech base many of their arguments on
its negative impact on its intended targets. An early examination of racist speech
focused on the psychological effects on the victims and the devastating impact hate
propaganda has been found to have on the self-esteem of its victims.' 8 Mari Matsuda
writes that racist hate messages, threats, slurs, and epithets convey messages of
inferiority that hit the gut of those in the target groups.' 9 Victims who attempt to avoid
such negative messages may be restricted in their personal freedom as they "quit jobs,
forgo education, leave their homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own
exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify their behavior and demeanor."
20
Researchers have attempted to evaluate in a more concrete way how hate speech
affects its victims. One national study of 2000 people investigated whether individuals
have physical or psychological symptoms when they are targeted by others'
prejudice. 2 ' The researchers were surprised to find abuse to be so prevalent; roughly
thirty percent of the sample indicated that they had experienced at least one incident of
prejudice-motivated violence or abuse during the preceding twelve months. 22 Though
the study asked about violence broadly, including physical violence, verbal attacks
were the most frequent type of violence reported. Of the individuals surveyed, roughly
one-third had experienced verbal attacks-abusive language, harassing telephone calls,
or hate mail.23 Most individuals who indicated that they had experienced "group
defamation" identified their skin color or race as the reason.
24
Examining racist and other types of prejudice-motivated speech, the researchers
identified distinctive psychological effects on individuals at whom this type of
17. For a discussion of the usage of slurs and epithets by players and fans, see Phoebe
Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially Hostile Environment, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287,
295-99 (1995).
18. See Martin Kazu Hiraga, Anti-Gay and -Lesbian Violence, Victimization, and
Defamation: Trends, Victimization Studies, and Incident Descriptions, in THE PRICE WE PAY:
THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY 109, 109-10
(Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND 53, 53-55 (Mar J.
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, & Kimnberl Williams Crenshaw eds.,
1993); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, in
WORDS THAT WOUND, supra, at 17, 20-22.
19. Matsuda, supra note 18, at 23-24.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Howard J. Ehrlich, Barbara E. K. Larcom & Robert D. Purvis, The Traumatic Impact of
Ethnoviolence, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA,
AND PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 18, at 62, 63-64.
22. Id. at 64.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 65. "Group defamation" consists of statements, verbal or otherwise, that are
directed at the group to which an individual belongs or with which she identifies rather than at
the individual herself Id.
[Vol. 84:963
RACIST SPEECH AND MINORITY RIGHTS
expression is targeted. After the attack, individuals targeted because of their skin color
or race tend to have significantly greater negative psychological symptoms than victims
of non-prejudiced attacks. Some of these symptoms include fear, stress, and
depression. A follow-up study conducted by the same researchers focused on workers'
experiences with incidents involving prejudice in a large corporation.25 Again a large
percentage of the events-twenty-one percent-consisted of race-based name-calling,
ethnic jokes, and comments.26 The second study found similar degrees of stress and
also that few victims reported the behavior of coworkers or supervisors to higher-ups.27
Research on racist speech has revealed much concerning its prevalence, context,
and circumstances. This research reveals that, at least in the United States, such
expression may leave racial and ethnic minorities at risk of verbal attacks in a variety
of locales ranging from their homes and workplaces to other public spaces. The
research also shows that racist expression can be more than just mildly distressing to its
victims. Race-based name-calling can make its victims fearful, leading to stress and
depression.28 These harmful effects have raised the specter of state regulation. United
States federal regulations on racist speech are considered in the next Part.
II. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON HATE SPEECH
A. The Relatively New Freedom of Protected Speech and Its Gradual Minimization
In the United States the biggest obstacle to state regulation of racist speech is the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble .... 29
The First Amendment places the United States in a somewhat distinctive position
with respect to hate speech.30 Though the United States has an established reputation
25. Id. at 69.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id. at 71-74.
28. See Howard J. Ehrlich, Barbara E. K. Larcom & Robert D. Purvis, The Traumatic
Impact of Ethnoviolence in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE
PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 18, at 62, 62-79.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. The U.S. position-one that is strongly opposed to regulations on hate speech-was
stated clearly in the revised draft it submitted of Article 4, Section (a) of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1964. The
United States favored a weaker position, one of only disallowing direct incitement to racist
violence rather than incitement to discrimination and violence. The U.S. position was rejected in
the final version of Article 4. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/dicerd.htm. The United States did not immediately ratify
the Convention, see OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS
OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INT'L HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 12 (2004) (stating that the
United States ratified the CERD in 1994), but rather signed it with a short reservation that does
not bind the United States to any action that would violate the First Amendment. See United




for opposing governmental regulation of racist expression, it is important to remember
that the meaningful protection of all individual rights in the United States, including
freedom of expression, has emerged relatively recently. In the 1920s, free speech was
considered a dangerous idea.3 1 It was not until the 1930s that the U.S. Supreme Court
issued the first opinions protecting freedom of speech.32
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of racist speech with challenges made
by an extremist White power group, the Ku Klux Klan, to state restrictions on
expression.33 In these early cases, the Supreme Court found that states could restrict
activities involving racist speech and other types of hate speech. In 1928, in Bryant v.
Zimmerman,34 the Supreme Court upheld a New York law that required certain groups
to register with the state. Some groups, but not the Klan, who challenged the law, were
exempted-labor unions, the Masonic order, and others-based on the idea that they
were legitimate.35 The Supreme Court found it constitutional to require the Klan to
register with the Secretary of State and turn over its membership lists.
36
Roughly a decade later, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,37 the Court again
considered the issue of extremist speech in a case involving a Jehovah's Witness who
became involved in a confrontation with police. Chaplinsky was arrested and convicted
for calling a police officer a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" under a
state law criminalizing the address of any "offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person" in public.38 According to the Supreme Court, the restrictions against
Chaplinsky were deemed appropriate since Chaplinsky's words were considered
"fighting words," a new category of speech which the Court found not to deserve
constitutional protection. 
39
In the early 1950s, the Supreme Court again turned to the issue of racist speech, this
time by tackling the issue of group libel. The case ofBeauharnais v. Illinois4° involved
the prosecution of Joseph Beauharnais, president of the White Circle League of
America, an organization created by Beauhamais to resist housing integration. The
City of Chicago was in the middle of a fractured battle over housing integration and
Beauhamais was convicted for distributing literature that stated: "If persuasion and the
need to prevent the White race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite
us, then the aggressions... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro,
surely will."' 1
Beauharnais was charged with publishing lithographs portraying "depravity,
criminality, unchastity or lack of virtue of citizens of [the] Negro race" and exposing
them to "contempt, derision, or obloquy. ' 42 Beauharnais's actions violated an Illinois
31. WALKER, supranote 5, at 12.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 25-26.
34. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
35. Id. at 73.
36. Id. at 77.
37. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
38. Id. at 569.
39. See id. at 571-72.
40. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
41. Id. at 252 (omission in original).
42. Id.
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statute that proscribed publications or other expressive works targeting "citizens of any
race, color, creed, or religion.' '43 Though several state statutes of this type were
proposed in the 1930s and 1940s, the Illinois statute was one ofvery few "race hate" or
group libel statutes to actually get enacted." Beauharnais challenged the Illinois
statute, which had been passed in 1917, as unconstitutionally vague and violative of the
First Amendment. 45 Citing Illinois's difficult racial history, and relying in part on its
decision in Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court upheld Beauharnais's conviction. The
Court decided that Beauhamais's conduct fell outside the scope of First Amendment
protection and that the legislature had the authority to take reasonable measures to
mitigate racial conflict, which was deemed a serious social evil.
46
B. Limits on Regulation: Marches, Speech Codes, and Cross Burning
Though Beauharnais seems to suggest that the First Amendment provides the
government with significant leeway allowing the State to restrict racist speech that
constitutes group libel, the five decades since that decision have been marked by a
tightening of the doctrine which heavily constricts the government's ability to regulate
racist speech. Even before the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of hate speech in
the early 1990s, Collin v. Smith47 and Doe v. University ofMichigan,48 two lower court
cases, were important bellwethers of limited state regulation of racist speech. In both of
these cases the courts chose to privilege the value of freedom of expression over the
equality interests of those who might be harmed by hate speech.
Collin concerned a challenge to three ordinances passed by the Village of Skokie,
Illinois, in response to a planned demonstration by Nazi leader Frank Collin, who had
previously led demonstrations that resulted in violence. 49 Collin's proposed
demonstration in front of the village hall involved fifty of his followers wearing Nazi
uniforms. In response to Collin's proposal, the village passed the three ordinances. The
first ordinance at issue required those applying to demonstrate in public to have
significant liability and property insurance; the second ordinance at issue banned
demonstration by those in uniform; and the third ordinance prohibited the distribution
43. Id. at251.
44. New Jersey's race hate statute was declared unconstitutional in 1934. WALKER, supra
note 5, at 82. Rhode Island's proposed statute was vetoed by its governor in 1944. Id. at 83. In
the few cases that states had passed such laws, in New Jersey and Massachusetts, for example,
the laws were rarely enforced. Id. at 82. In 1943, a federal law, H.R. 2328, was proposed that
would have allowed the postmaster general to prohibit the mailing of material containing
"defamatory and false statements" based on "race or religion." Id. at 83. The American Civil
Liberties Union, which had opposed other such legislation, mounted a campaign against H.R.
2328 and it was defeated. Id. at 83-84.
45. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251 (challenging statute under Fourteenth Amendment for
state's violation of First Amendment rights).
46. Id. at 261-67.
47. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
48. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
49. Immediately preceding the Skokie incident, Collin had been involved in stirring up
controversy over racial integration on the west side of Chicago. WALKER, supra note 5, at 120-
21. White neighborhood Marquette Park was quite resistant to Blacks moving in and Collin
found an audience sympathetic to his racist views. Id.
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of literature that promotes and incites hatred against persons by reason of race, national
origin, or religion.50 These ordinances were enacted because over half of the town's
residents were Jewish, several thousand of whom were survivors of the Nazi
Holocaust. Collin challenged the ordinances. In responding to the challenge, the village
relied on Beauharnais, but the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, contending that
Beauharnais had been significantly weakened. 5' The court declared the uniform and
literature bans unconstitutional on the grounds that the ordinances attempted to
regulate the content of the message being communicated by the demonstrators.52
Doe evaluated hate speech in an entirely different context than Collin.53 This case
from the Eastern District of Michigan challenged the University of Michigan's campus
hate speech code. Campus speech codes prohibiting the use of racist and other
offensive speech on campus were passed by several colleges and universities in the
1980s and early 1990s in the wake of several high-profile racial incidents on college
campuses.54 Doe was the most well-known case, though several other cases challenged
similar codes.55 Michigan's code "prohibited individuals, under the penalty of
sanctions, from 'stigmatizing or victimizing' individuals or groups on the basis of their
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status. 5 6 According to the case, the
policy had been enacted in the wake of a number of racially offensive incidents. The
policy was challenged by Doe, a biopsychology graduate student. Doe, who had never
been sanctioned under the policy, mounted a facial challenge to it, arguing the code
had a chilling effect on classroom discussion. 7 He maintained that controversial
theories, for instance, those positing biologically based differences between sexes and
races, might be perceived as "sexist" and "racist" by some students. 58 "[H]e feared that
discussion of such theories might be sanctionable under the [p]olicy." 59 His challenge
asserted that "his right to freely and openly discuss such theories was impermissibly
chilled, and he requested that the policy be declared unconstitutional and enjoined on
the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.
'60
The court agreed with the plaintiff that the policy was vague and overbroad,
insisting that the terms of the Michigan policy "were so vague that its enforcement
50. See Collin, 578 F.2dat 1199-1200.
51. See id. at 1204.
52. See id. at 1200-08.
53. Compare Collin, 578 F.2d 1197 (challenging city ordinances on the basis that they
unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression), with Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852 (challenging
university hate speech on grounds that it unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression in
the classroom).
54. WALKER, supra note 5, at 129. One of these incidents occurred at the University of
Massachusetts after the 1986 World Series and involved White Boston Red Sox fans chasing
and beating Black New York Mets fans. Id.
55. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down Wisconsin's code on the grounds that it violated
the First Amendment).
56. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 853.
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would violate the due process clause." 61 Although the district court was sympathetic to
the university's obligation to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its
students, it issued an injunction preventing the policy from being enforced. The court
found that the university had not "seriously attempted to reconcile [its] efforts to
combat discrimination with the requirements of the First Amendment., 62 In failing to
strike this balance, the court indicated that the university's actions were taken "at the
expense of free speech.,
63
Doe and Collin were quickly followed by a very significant limitation on any state's
ability to regulate racist speech, this time from the U.S. Supreme Court. R.A. V. v. City
of St. Paul64 involved a challenge to a conviction for having burned a cross on a Black
family's lawn. The defendant was charged under St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance. This particular ordinance restricted the placement on public or private
property of an object or symbol, such as a burning cross or Nazi swastika, that one has
reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. '65 R.A.V., along with three other individuals, was
charged and convicted under the ordinance after having burned several crosses on the
lawn and in the vicinity of the Joneses' home. The Joneses were Black and had recently
moved to a White neighborhood.
R.A.V. challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, alleging that the
ordinance under which he was convicted was substantially overbroad. 66 He also
maintained that the statute was impermissibly content based. On appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, this challenge was rejected. The Minnesota Supreme Court
interpreted the ordinance to simply regulate "fighting words," a permissible form of
regulation for speech according to the Supreme Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.67 With respect to the issue of whether the ordinance ran afoul of the First
Amendment because it constituted content-based regulation, the Minnesota court held
that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to address the compelling government interest
of protecting the community against possible violence and disorder.
68
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction. The Court
firmly rejected the argument that the First Amendment allows a city to use the fighting
words doctrine to regulate racist speech. According to the Court, the city's mistake was
regulating fighting words that provoke violence on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender. By regulating only this particular subset of fighting words and not
other forms of fighting words as well, the city had engaged in impermissible content-
based regulation. This particular statute, according to the Court, signaled that the city
was trying to suppress messages inherent in particular symbols. In doing so, the city
had unconstitutionally "impose[d] special prohibitions on those speakers who express
61. Id. at 867.
62. Id. at 868.
63. Id.
64. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
65. Id. at 380.
66. Id.
67. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 509-10 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplinksy v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)), rev 'd, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
68. Id. at 511.
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views on disfavored subjects., 69 The Court also rejected the city's argument that it
could use this particular form of legislation to prevent violence and disorder. As a
content-based regulation, this particular ordinance was not aimed at the secondary
effects of the speech, but rather at its primary effects-the listener's negative
70
reaction.
Perhaps because it was a speech case that involved conduct, R.A. V. had a far-
reaching effect on the state regulation of bias-motivated speech and behavior. After the
decision, state courts in Washington, South Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, and New
Jersey held their cross-burning statutes unconstitutional.7 1 In each of these cases, the
courts justified their decisions by relying on the R.A. V opinion.
C. A Slight Expansion of States'Right to Regulate
The most recent Supreme Court cases addressing hate speech suggest that the Court
may have retreated from the hard-line, anti-regulation approach it took in R.A. V. The
first of these cases to signal a slight rejection of the Court's earlier approach was
Wisconsin v. Mitchell.72 Mitchell involved a First Amendment challenge to
Wisconsin's hate crime statute. Hate crimes, which may or may not involve "hate
speech," are a fairly new category in American criminal law. Hate crimes are criminal
acts motivated by prejudice on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or any other
protected category.73 Wisconsin's hate crime statute was a penalty enhancement
statute.74 If the defendant was found guilty of committing a hate crime, then the penalty
associated with the underlying crime increased.75
Wisconsin v. Mitchell involved a challenge by Todd Mitchell, a Black man who had
urged the attack of Gregory Reddick, a fourteen-year-old White youth.76 For his role in
the attack, Mitchell was charged and convicted under Wisconsin's hate crime penalty
enhancement statute, which allowed increased penalties for crimes against victims or
property intentionally selected because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, or ancestry of the individual or property owner. Because
the jury found that the crime had been committed as a result of Reddick's race,
Mitchell's sentence was increased from two to four years. In his challenge, Mitchell
69. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391.
70. See id. at 393-96.
71. See State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993); State v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349,354-55
(N.J. 1994); State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511 (S.C. 1993); Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d
738 (Va. 2001), affd in part and vacated in part by Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003);
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
72. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
73. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 399 (8th ed. 2004).
74. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480 & n.1.
75. See id.
76. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992). According to the court, before the
attack the men had been discussing the film Mississippi Burning, which depicts the investigation
of the 1964 murder of three civil rights workers by White supremacists. After watching the film,
Mitchell is reported to have asked the group, "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some White
people?" When he spotted Reddick, Mitchell said, "There goes a White boy, go get him."
Mitchell counted to three and then the group attacked Reddick. Id. at 813-14.
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contended that the Wisconsin statute was overbroad. According to Mitchell, by
regulating both protected and unprotected speech, the statute violated the First
Amendment." Relying primarily on R.A. V, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the
statute facially invalid because it directly punished a defendant's constitutionally
protected thought. The statute was struck down. 8
At the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the Justices took a different approach and
found that the Wisconsin hate crime statute was constitutional. The Court closely
examined the issue of motivation and whether the use of evidence of racial motivation,
such as slurs or epithets, impermissibly violated the First Amendment. 79 The Court
chose to rely on an earlier case, Barclay v. Florida,0 which involved a group trying to
start a race war. In that case, the Court approved the use of the defendant's racial
motivation as an aggravating factor in deciding whether or not he would be eligible for
the death penalty. 8 By allowing Wisconsin and other jurisdictions to use hate crime
statutes, the Court was in effect ruling that Mitchell's racist speech, when indicative of
why he committed a crime, was not expression protected by the First Amendment. 2
The Court rejected the argument, made by several scholars critical of hate crime
legislation, that using racist speech as evidence of motivation constitutes punishment
for bigoted sentiments and violates the First Amendment by creating "thought"
crimes.8 3 The decision in Mitchell affirned that punishing a criminal because he
selected a victim based on that individual's race will not violate the First
Amendment. 84
The Supreme Court's most recent decision evaluating racist speech also dealt with
speech bundled with racist violence. In Virginia v. Black,85 the Supreme Court once
again examined the First Amendment protection for cross burning. Black involved an
appeal by the Commonwealth of Virginia from a Virginia Supreme Court decision that
struck down the Commonwealth's cross-burning statute on First Amendment grounds.
Virginia's statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to bum, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property
of another, or highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a class 6 felony.
86
77. Id. at 809.
78. Id. at 814-17.
79. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 485-87.
80. 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 486.
81. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 949.
82. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489.
83. See generally Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39
UCLA L. REv. 333 (1991); Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression:
Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, CRIM. JUST. ETHIcs,
Summer/Fall 1992, at 29. For a discussion of the arguments made by scholars critical of hate
crime legislation, see Bell, supra note 8, at 74-76.
84. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-90.
85. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
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Similar to the statute in R.A. V., which had been passed in the 1970s when many of
St. Paul's synagogues were under attack, 87 Virginia's statute was a response to actual
racial violence. It passed its cross-burning statute in 1952, after a spate of cross
burning by the Ku Klux Klan. 8 The First Amendment arguments directed at the statute
in Black involved two fairly different fact scenarios. One of the defendants, Barry
Elton Black, was convicted of violating the statute after supervising the burning of a
cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally. The cross, which was between twenty-five and thirty feet
tall, was located on a piece of property near the highway. The second set of defendants,
Richard J. Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara, were charged with having violated Virginia's
cross-burning statute when they burned a cross in the yard of James Jubilee, Elliott's
Black next-door neighbor. According to the defendants, the cross burning was in
response to Jubilee's complaint about Elliott firing shots in the backyard. Like Black,
both Elliott and O'Mara were convicted of having violated the Virginia statute.
The three defendants' cases were consolidated at the Virginia Supreme Court. On
appeal, Black, Elliott, and O'Mara argued that Virginia's statute was unconstitutional
because it engaged in viewpoint and content discrimination. 89 In evaluating the
petitioners' arguments, the Virginia Supreme Court considered R.A. V., in which the
Supreme Court had invalidated a conviction for cross burning. The Virginia Supreme
Court insisted that the statute at issue in Black was "analytically indistinguishable"
from the statute at issue in R.A. V and, therefore, constituted content-based regulation
of speech.90 According to the court, even though the Virginia statute did not mention
race or gender, its specific prohibition of cross burning-which occurs in a distinct
contemporary context-indicated that the Commonwealth's interest was focused on the
content of the expression. 91 Though content-based legislation is sometimes acceptable
on First Amendment grounds, in this case, despite the Commonwealth's insistence that
the statute had been passed "[i]n an atmosphere of racial, ethnic, and religious
intolerance," the court found that the statute was not aimed at the negative "secondary
effects" of cross burning.92 Because the statute was aimed at regulating content, and it
was overbroad, it was struck down.
When Black was argued before the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth maintained
that the cross-burning statute merely signaled its wish to prevent an especially
pernicious form of intimidation. 93 In support of its contention that the statute was
content neutral, the Commonwealth highlighted both the statute's content-neutral
language and the existence of several racially discriminatory laws at the time the cross-
burning statute was passed as evidence that it was not interested in proscribing the
message in cross burning. Rather, according to this argument, the fact that the
Commonwealth had not eliminated the racially discriminatory laws at the time the
87. Laura J. Lederer, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: An Interview with Tom Foley, in THE
PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY,
supra note 18, at 194, 196.
88. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742 (Va. 200 1), aff'd in part and vacated in
part by Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
89. Id. at 740-41.
90. Id. at 742-43.
91. Id. at 743-44.
92. Id. at 745.
93. Brief of Petitioner at 17-19, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
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cross-burning statute was passed indicated that the statute was not directed at White
supremacists' views.
In its decision upholding the ability of jurisdictions to regulate cross burning in
particular circumstances, though mindful of the cross burners' right to freedom of
expression, the Supreme Court gave far more deference than it had in R.A. V. to the way
cross burning has been used historically to terrorize Black Americans. The opinion
began with a long description of the historical use of cross burning. The Court
maintained that "[t]he person who bums a cross directed at a particular person often is
making a serious threat, meant to coerce the victim to comply with the Klan's wishes
unless the victim is willing to risk the wrath of the Klan."
94
After condemning the historical use of cross burning by the Klan, the Court divided
cross burnings into two categories: (1) cross bumings in which the perpetrator had
intended to intimidate, and (2) those in which the perpetrator had no wish to intimidate
listeners. The second category consists of cross burning that occurs in several different
contexts, for instance, when cross burning is used as a statement of ideology, as a sign
of group solidarity, or, finally, purely for artistic expression. 95 The Court's decision
allows states to regulate the first category, cross burnings undertaken with the intent to
intimidate. Justice O'Connor located the rationale for this allowance in one of the
exceptions to the general prohibition on content-based regulation created by the Court
in the R.A. V. case. Under this exception, when the State is attempting to regulate a
subset of a category that may be excluded, the entire category may be prohibited.96 The
second category, referred to by Justice Thomas in his dissent as "innocent" cross
bumings,97 is identified by the Court as core political speech, and the decision prohibits
states from regulating it.
98
The U.S. approach to regulation of racist speech is one of broad protection, with the
exception of situations in which such speech is coupled with violence. Attempts to
regulate racist speech on college campuses has largely failed, with hate speech codes
challenged at the University of Michigan 99 and the University of Wisconsin.
100
Interestingly enough, research in this area reveals that, though the universities whose
codes were held unconstitutional complied by removing their codes, twenty-five
percent of schools nationwide failed to comply with court decisions and left their codes
intact.' 01 In the public arena, after R.A. V., racist speech is subject to little regulation
and may not be prohibited simply because the State disfavors the viewpoint it offers.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell and Virginia v. Black, the cross-burning cases that left R.A. V
intact, are the Court's two most recent statements on racist speech, and they permit
regulation of racist speech. Taken together, these final two cases suggest that the safest
path to the regulation of racist speech, from a First Amendment perspective, is to
regulate racist speech only when it is coupled with violence.
94. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003).
95. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 361-63.
97. Id. at 398 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 365-67.
99. Doe v. Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
100. UMW Post v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991);
see supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
101. JON B. GOULD, SPEAK No EViL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEEcH REGULATION 159 (2005).
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III. COMPARATIvE APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH RACIST SPEECH
A. Approaches to Racist Speech
The U.S. approach, in which racist speech is protected except when it constitutes a
threat, contrasts quite strongly with the treatment of racist speech worldwide. For
instance, more than thirty European countries place restrictions on racist speech.
Countries with restrictions on the use of racist speech include both common law
countries (like Great Britain, Canada, India, Australia, and Nigeria) and countries that
follow a civil law tradition (including, but not limited to, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Israel). Commentators have divided these regulations into
two types: those designed to safeguard public order, and those aimed at protecting
human dignity. Criminal laws in the area of hate speech in Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, Israel, and Australia are of the former variety. They are based on the idea that
hate speech that vilifies a group poses a more serious threat to the public order than
insults directed at a person for his or her personal characteristics.'0 2 Unfortunately, the
existence of these laws by themselves is no guarantee that the rights of minorities will
be protected. According to Sandra Coliver, this type of hate speech law has not been
effectively enforced, in part because the laws are not used as often as they should be.
For example, as of 1992, Northern Ireland had only one prosecution for incitement to
religious hatred in the twenty-one years that the law had been in force.'
0 3
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have fairly similar hate
speech laws, which commentators say are actively enforced. Hate speech laws in these
countries have both criminal and civil penalties and are premised on the need to protect
human dignity "quite apart from any interest in safeguarding public order."' 1 4 A
conviction under the criminal incitement laws of Canada requires proof ofeither intent
to incite hatred or, in the alternative, the likelihood of breaching the peace. By contrast,
one can be convicted under the hate speech laws of France, Denmark, Germany, and
the Netherlands without intending to incite hatred and without having breached the
peace.
10 5
The approach taken by countries around the world to place restrictions on racist
speech is also reflected in the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. These human rights instruments, though they explicitly protect
freedom of expression, also recognize the link between hate speech and discrimination
and allow significant restrictions on hate speech. 106 Article 20(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "any advocacy of national, racial or
102. Sandra Coliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE
SPEECH, FREEDOM OF ExPREssION AND NoN-DIsCzMmINAION 363, 366 (Sandra Coliver ed.,
1992).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 363.
105. Id. at 364.
106. For an interesting discussion of the debates over the hate speech articles in these
treaties, see Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations
of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
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religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall
be prohibited by law."' 0 7 Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires governments to outlaw all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. It also requires them to
prohibit all organizations which promote and incite racial discrimination.' 
08
B. Comparative Race Theory and Racist Speech
The approach taken by countries around the world, which divorces states' abilities
to regulate racist speech from the threat of violence, has much in common with the
arguments made by scholars in the American Critical Race Theory movement. Critical
Race Theory consists of writings by leftist scholars that challenge the ways in which
race and racial power are constructed and represented in American legal culture and
society.'°9 The work of critical race theorists has two aims. The first is to understand
how a White supremacist regime that oppresses people of color is maintained in
America. The second is to break the bond that currently exists between law and racial
power.'1 10 The writings of critical race theorists present arguments weighted in favor of
equality in a way that might allow American courts to strike a better balance between
freedom of expression and the rights of states to safeguard equality and prevent
violence.
Critical race theorists support restrictions on hate speech because they believe that
its use results in the subordination of people of color in society. One example of
subordination caused by the use of hate speech is the inequality in the exchange of
ideas between those who use it and those against whom it is used. In direct contrast to
those who believe that all ideas are traded freely in the "marketplace of ideas," critical
race theorists argue that bigoted ideas have more influence than other views. Charles
Lawrence argues that the experience of Black Americans and other people of color has
shown the tenacity of racism in the supposedly ideologically neutral free market. He
writes that the "idea ofthe racial inferiority of non-Whites infects, skews, and disables
the ... market .... ,"11 In addition, the menacing historical legacy of threats and
violence means that racist words become inextricably linked to racial violence. Thus,
the very real fear of provoking violence silences people of color. Critical race theorists
argue that if all people are allowed to exchange ideas freely, then racist speech, which
does not allow the normal social intercourse necessary for the free exchange of ideas,
should be restricted.'1"
2
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, openedfor signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
108. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
109. Introduction to CRITcAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGs THAT FORMED THE
MovEMENT xiii (1995).
110. Id.
111. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 53, 77.
112. See, e.g., id. at 77 (describing how racist speech distorts the marketplace of ideas).
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Aside from the harm that hate speech causes, critical race theorists argue that hate
speech should be regulated because the implications of violent racist ideas conflict with
democratic ideals of a diverse society.' 13 Richard Delgado maintains:
Racism is a breach of the ideal of egalitarianism, that "all men are created equal"
and each person is an equal moral agent, an ideal that is a cornerstone of the
American moral and legal system. A society in which some members regularly are
subjected to degradation because of their race hardly exemplifies this ideal." 4
The most compelling argument in support of equality made by critical race theorists
and others to justify hate speech regulations is the link between racist and other hate
speech and an incitement to violence. One commentator, Loretta Ross, finds a link
between the use of hate speech by hate groups and the occurrence of hate crimes-
crimes motivated by prejudice on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, or
color.1 5 She asserts that hate speech is a powerful weapon of hate groups. Public
rallies and demonstrations help such groups gain visibility and attract recruits. 116 Hate
speech encourages even those who are not members to commit hate crimes. 117 Klan
marches in the United States, Ross points out, often polarize residents and may
provoke violence after the events.1 18 The resulting violence in this instance is
discriminatory and linked directly to speech. This connection between hate speech and
the intentional selection of victims should create a burden on the government to restrict
the speech that leads to violence.
In a similar vein to the work of Ross, Alexander Tsesis uses several historical
examples to illustrate the connection between racist ideology and extreme forms of
racialized violence.' 19 In his book illustrating the historical lessons and dangers of hate
speech, Tsesis examines anti-Jewish rhetoric in Germany, White supremacist rhetoric
in the United States, and images depicting indigenous Americans as inferior. 120 Racist
expression in these contexts is far from harmless. Such expression, according to Tsesis,
is characteristic of "misethnicity" group hatred and intends not just to demean
individual members of particular groups, but also to characterize entire groups as
morally corrupt and inferior. 12 1 "Dehumanizing the targeted outgroup legitimizes
efforts to harm them.'
22
113. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A TortActionforRacial Insults, Epithets and
Name Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 18, at 89, 108 (insisting racial insults do not
further the goal of permitting individuals to voice their opinions).
114. Id. at 92-93.
115. Loretta J. Ross, Hate Groups, African Americans, and the First Amendment, in THE
PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY,
supra note 18, at 151, 153.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 154.
118. Id.
119. See ALEXANDER TSEsIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY
FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 9-79 (2002).
120. Id. at 11-65.
121. Id. at 81-82.
122. Id. at 105.
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Tsesis maintains that racist hate speech is far from a harmless release for those who
do not like particular groups. Rather, it can be a tool for those intent on spreading
group hatred. Tsesis describes the work of "hate propagandists" who have used racist
and other forms of hate speech to spread group hatred at various points in European
and American history. Members of outgroups are labeled as problems, are objectified,
and are considered an infestation corrupting the body politic. The cures for this
"infestation," manufactured through the spreading of group hatred, are all too often
violent-genocide, unfair and inequitable subordination, and separation.
23
CONCLUSION
The structure of First Amendment doctrine in the United States has led to a regime
that is ill prepared to deal with important negative consequences of racist speech. As a
primary matter, this is true because, at least after R.A. V., racist speech is explicitly
protected under the First Amendment. The U.S. approach also is characterized by an
unwise and artificial separation between hate speech, which is protected expression
unless it advocates violence, and hate crime, which may be punished.
This wall of separation between nonviolent hate speech and hate crime fails to
recognize the critical interaction between the two entities, as demonstrated by the
following example. In 1996, Matthew Hale assumed leadership of the World Church of
the Creator (WTC), an organization dedicated to the supremacy of the White race.
Among other things, Hale preached that racial and ethnic minorities are inferior to
Whites. In 1999, one of his followers, Benjamin Smith, took his gospel dehumanizing
minorities seriously. Smith embarked on a shooting spree targeting Jews, Blacks, and
Asian Americans that left two people dead and twelve people injured. 24
Because Hale had not explicitly preached violence, his speech was protected. The
U.S. approach, which protects racist speech that does not threaten or incite violence,
fails to acknowledge that White supremacists' racist ideology blames racial and ethnic
minorities for all of society's ills. When demagogues and leaders of hate groups use
racist and hate propaganda, they are seeking followers whose attachment to the
organization is premised on seeing members of outgroups as less than human. Once
minorities are assumed to be subhuman, there is no longer any reason not to eliminate
them by attacking them physically. At least some followers of the WTC seem to share
the view that minorities should be eliminated through attack. Smith was one of several
members of the WTC engaged in violence against minorities. 25 Contrary to the views
of critics of hate speech legislation who dismiss arguments suggesting a connection
between racist rhetoric and violence, the actions of Smith and others like him suggest
that racist speech urging listeners to disregard the humanity of particular citizens may
have violent and not unforeseeable consequences.
123. Seeid at117.
124. Pam Belluck, Hate Groups Seeking Broader Reach, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1999, at Al 6;
Bill Dedman, Suspect Sought in Attacks Said to Kill Himself, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1999, at Al.
125. Belluck, supra note 124 (describing the killing of a number of minorities by individuals
affiliated with the World Church of the Creator).
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